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NOTES ON OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
IN ATS LITIGATION
William R. Casto*
INTRODUCTION
Yousuf, 1

In Samantar v.
the U.S. Supreme Court held that foreign
officials sued under the Alien Tort Statute 2 (ATS) are not the same as a
foreign state and are not entitled to the protection of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act 3 (FSIA). The Court, however, left open the possibility that
the officials might nevertheless be entitled to some form of “immunity
under the common law.” 4 Now the lower courts, and eventually the
Supreme Court, will have to grapple with this yet-to-be-defined defense.
The present Article suggests some considerations that may be of value in
creating a federal common law immunity for foreign officials in ATS
litigation. 5
The issue of foreign official immunity in ATS litigation arises in the
context of an unusual hybrid tort action. The norm that regulates the
defendant’s conduct comes from international law, which is a peculiar
* Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University. I wish to thank Professors Bryan
Camp, Chimène Keitner, Richard Murphy, and Ingrid Wuerth for their comments and
assistance regarding the present Article.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. Id. §§ 1330, 1602.
4. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292–93.
5. As a technical matter, ATS litigation is a misnomer. The ATS is jurisdictional and
“‘does not create a . . . cause of action.’” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)
(quoting William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479–80 (1986));
accord id. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, ATS litigation involves a highly
specialized tort in which the “norm [to be] enforced . . . comes from international law,”
which is a peculiar form of federal common law, and the remedy and many other aspects of
the cause of action come from ordinary federal domestic law. See William R. Casto, The
New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 635, 639 (2006) [hereinafter Casto, Common Law]. Although the ATS is
limited to aliens, an American tortured or enslaved in a foreign government by foreign
officials surely would be entitled to the same cause of action, and the federal court’s subject
matter jurisdiction would be available under the general federal question statute. Id. at 664–
65. Moreover, some ATS litigation by aliens has no direct relation whatsoever to the ATS
because Congress has codified and expanded the common law cause of action in the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (TVPA). Unless otherwise limited,
the present Article uses the phrase “ATS litigation” to refer to TVPA actions and to all
hybrid domestic tort actions in which the norm that the defendant is alleged to have violated
comes from international law and the private remedy comes from domestic federal common
law.
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species of federal common law. 6 On the other hand, the availability of the
remedy and many related issues are creatures of ordinary 7 domestic
common law. 8 Given that the doctrine of foreign official immunity
operates as a defense to a federal cause of action, the defense clearly is an
issue of federal, not state, law. Moreover, the defense has such clear
foreign policy implications that the issue would be federal in any event. 9
In creating the federal common law of foreign official immunity, judges
will encounter a number of linguistic pitfalls that may confuse the decisionmaking process. One of these is jurisprudential. Over the years, American
lawyers’ understanding of the common law has experienced a radical
change. In discussing foreign official immunity for the twenty-first
century, there is a tendency for advocates and even courts to use an imagery
based upon a natural law understanding of the common law that has long
since been abandoned. The present Article begins with a discussion of this
particular linguistic pitfall.10
Then the Article briefly notes the many meanings of the word
“immunity.” 11 There is a tendency—again among advocates—to use
precedent involving one type of immunity to establish the appropriate
parameters of a significantly different type of immunity. 12 The inevitable
result is irritation and confusion.
Narrowing the immunity to the more precise issue of government
officers’ tort liability for official misconduct does not eliminate the
linguistic problems.
There is significant confusion regarding
determinations of whether an ATS defendant has acted in an official
capacity. 13 Fortunately, Congress’s enactment of the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) has provided clear guidance on this issue.14
In addition to the conundrum of official capacity, the existence of a fully
elaborated federal common law system of official immunity in
constitutional tort litigation may become a source of confusion. Despite the
superficial similarity of labels, this system of official immunity for
6. See Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 641–42. International law is a peculiar
species of federal common law because the federal courts lack legislative authority to make
international law. No single nation has the power to create or modify international law.
Therefore, American lawyers’ positivist faith that judges legislate the common law does not
work in this very narrow area. Instead, the courts seek to discover existing international law
using all of the traditional resources of international law.
7. Ordinary in the sense that federal courts have authority to legislate rules rather than
find them in international law. See supra note 6.
8. See William R. Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the Twenty-First Century,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 694–99 (2006). See generally Casto, Common Law, supra note 5.
9. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 467–68 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1042–44 (1967). For a recent and
superb analysis, see Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S.
Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 954–57 (2011).
10. See infra notes 23–45 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 38, 64 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 59–89 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 89, 149–162 and accompanying text.
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domestic misconduct has little or no relevance to foreign official
immunity. 15
The Article concludes by explaining that the defense of foreign official
immunity inevitably will involve the weighing and balancing of a number
of factors. 16 These factors include input from a defendant officer’s
government, input from the executive branch, the plaintiff’s nationality,
whether the alleged tort took place during military operations, and others.17
Finally, when judges confer to decide the scope of foreign official
immunity, there will be an elephant 18 in the room. Modern ATS litigation
stems from Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 19 in which a federal court held that a
Paraguayan police chief who tortured to death a fellow citizen in Paraguay
was subject to tort liability for violating the international law against
torture. 20 At some level, Filartiga is in conflict with the United States
government’s subsequent formal embrace of torture as an appropriate tool
for implementing official policy. This conflict presents federal judges with
an unsavory dilemma. Should a foreign torturer be treated the same way as
an American torturer? Some judges may be inclined to protect an American
torturer from personal liability to the extent that the American was only
following orders. If so, these judges may feel obliged to extend similar
protections to foreign torturers. The present Article suggests that under our
domestic law, though not international law, there are significant distinctions
between the tort liability of domestic and foreign torturers.21
I. CONFUSION AND FALSE STARTS
A. The Common Law
The Samantar Court’s reference to foreign official “immunity under the
common law” 22 can be grammatically confusing because, for American
lawyers, the notion of free-standing, amorphous common law no longer
exists. There was a time when we spoke of the common law as a general
body of law inherent in nature. 23 This natural law vision, however, has
long since been supplanted by legal positivism. 24 Today the common law
15. See infra notes 90–108 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 168–180 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 168–180 and accompanying text.
18. The pun is intended.
19. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at 878.
21. See infra notes 123–137 and accompanying text.
22. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292–93; see supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
23. See William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional
Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 907–08 (1988).
24. This Article uses a somewhat narrow concept of legal positivism that is limited to
the simple idea that common law rules are legislated by judges. The idea originated with
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (1st ed. 1832); Jeremy Bentham, Truth Versus Ashhurst, in 5 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (John Bowring ed., 1843); see also WILFRID E. RUMBLE, THE
THOUGHT OF JOHN AUSTIN: JURISPRUDENCE, COLONIAL REFORM, AND THE BRITISH
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is simply a label that refers to legal rules and principles that judges
legislate. This positivist understanding of common law has held sway in
the United States at least since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 25 The
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 26 noted with specific reference
to ATS litigation that the common law is “made or created” by judges. 27
In the judicial legislative mill, the most important grist is found in prior
judicial decisions. Many, maybe most, common law rules may therefore be
described as preexisting rules found in judicial precedent. Sometimes,
however, judges are called upon to apply common law rules for which there
is no controlling precedent. In this situation, the judges must legislate a rule
founded upon complex considerations of common sense and public policy.
Two recent and thoughtful analyses of official immunity flirt with the old
natural law vision of the common law. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith
begin their analysis with a flat statement that “at common law in both Great
Britain and the United States, suits against foreign officials for their official
acts were considered suits against the foreign state and thus were subject to
the state’s immunity.” 28 Likewise, the executive branch’s amicus brief in
Samantar, signed by the Attorney General and the State Department Legal
Adviser, notes that in enacting the FSIA, “Congress thus assumed that
existing law would continue to govern the immunity of those officials.”29
Presumably this diction referring to a preexisting common law of official
immunity is simply a matter of advocacy rather than a conscious invocation
of the archaic, natural law vision of the common law. In what must be
dismissed as sloppy writing, courts have also indulged the anachronistic
notion that common law rules of decision may exist in a vacuum devoid of
mandatory precedent. 30
Because the common law is a system of rules and principles legislated by
courts, its rules of decision cannot exist until the courts have so legislated.
Therefore, any claim of a pre-existing common law rule of official
CONSTITUTION 109–43 (1985). The story of the legal profession’s shift from a natural law
vision of the common law to a legal positivist vision is told in some detail in Casto, supra
note 23.
25. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
27. Id. at 725; see also id. at 729 (“[W]e now tend to understand common law not as a
discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of human
choice.”).
28. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Domestic
Officer Suits, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 137, 141 (2010). But see Chimène I. Keitner, Officially
Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2010),
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-keitner-officially-immune.pdf. Although I disagree with
the professors’ conclusions, they have provided an excellent analysis of the various
considerations favoring a broad doctrine of foreign official immunity.
29. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 19, Samantar
v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555), 2010 WL 342031 [hereinafter Brief for the
United States] (emphasis added); see also id. at 27 (“[O]fficials generally continue to enjoy
immunity.”).
30. For example, in Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009), the court purported to
apply a well-established common law rule of foreign official immunity without citing a
single case involving official immunity.
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immunity is merely wishful thinking unless based upon empirical evidence
of judicial precedent. Unfortunately, after conducting a thorough search of
actual judicial precedent, the government has been able to find only one
decision directly on point: a lonely and unreported trial judge’s opinion.31
The Samantar Court generously commented that the precedents are “few
and far between.” 32 In the early 1960s, the American Law Institute (ALI)
conducted a far ranging exploration of foreign relations law and found
nothing to suggest the existence of a general common law doctrine of
foreign official immunity. 33 The 1965 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States makes no mention of a general rule of
foreign official immunity. In 1987, the ALI revisited the topic, and the
resulting Restatement is also silent. 34
The government and Professors Bradley and Goldsmith cite a number of
cases that they suggest are foreign official immunity cases, but the cases do
not support the proposition for which they are proffered. The Supreme
Court and the ALI agree that the immunity defenses of Heads of State and
Consuls are sui generis and governed by rules unique to these particular
officials. 35 Although the government and the professors presumably
agree, 36 many of the cases that they cite fall into these sui generis
categories. 37 Act-of-State cases are also cited, but like the Head-of-State
cases and the consul cases, the Act-of-State cases simply do not involve
foreign official immunity. 38
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith also cite two ancient Attorney General
opinions and a smattering of English case law spread over a century and a
half, 39 but arcane Attorney General opinions from the eighteenth century
31. See Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734, 1976 WL 841 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23,
1976).
32. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 73–82 (1965). This Restatement included a provision that some suits against
individual officers should be treated as the functional equivalent of a suit against the state
and therefore subject to dismissal under the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. Id.
§ 66(f). This provision, however, was not an official immunity provision. See infra notes
110–113 and accompanying text.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 464–470 (1987).
35. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285 n.6, 2289 n.12; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 464–465.
36. Brief for the United States, supra note 29, at 11 n.5 (Head of State).
37. See id. (citing Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004)); id. at 12 n.6 (citing
United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997)); id. at 10–11 (citing Heaney v.
Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504–06 (2d Cir. 1971); Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F.
Supp. 319, 320–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 144
(citing Heaney, 445 F.2d at 504; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1929)).
38. In Samantar, the Court noted that “the act of state doctrine is distinct from
immunity.” Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2290; see Chimène I. Keitner, Annotated Brief of
Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents in Samantar v. Yousuf, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 609, 614–16 (2011).
39. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 141–42; Keitner, supra note 28, at 11;
Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61,
67–68 (2010).

578

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

cannot in any way establish a pre-existing federal common law for the
twenty-first century. To repeat: today, in the twenty-first century, federal
common law is legislated by federal courts. Simply put, the Attorney
General of the United States has no legislative authority. Of course, the
British courts do have common law authority, but their legislative authority
extends to creating British common law—not federal common law. Neither
the Attorney General nor the British courts have any power whatsoever to
make federal common law.
The government and the professors quote from one barely relevant 1895
Second Circuit case that enunciates a rule that looks like a rule of foreign
official immunity, but the Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds.40 By
traditional common law reasoning, the lower court opinion is—to be
frank—clearly irrelevant, 41 and even if it had relevance, the lower court’s
opinion is hardly persuasive. For example, suppose that a court in Texas
has to determine what the common law of Texas is today on a particular
issue. What kind of lawyer would come into court and argue that the
common law of Texas in the twenty-first century is established by a single
hundred-year-old, lower-court opinion that the Texas Supreme Court
affirmed on other grounds?
The perils of divining a common law doctrine from a few cases and
pronouncements scattered across a century and a half are illustrated by
comparing the government’s and the professors’ conclusions. When the
Attorney General and the State Department looked at the few barely
40. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d on other grounds,
168 U.S. 250 (1897). The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the defendant was a
military officer acting in time of war. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 253–54. Today, Underhill is
viewed as an act-of-state decision. See, e.g., Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2290; W.S. Kirkpatrick
& Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). In Underhill, the plaintiff sought a judicial
determination that a Venezuelan official had violated Venezuelan law in Venezuela. See
Underhill, 65 F. at 578; infra note 41.
There was not even a suggestion that the Underhill defendant had violated
international law. In subsequent developments, the Supreme Court has held that “the greater
the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it.” Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 428. Today there is an overwhelming consensus that state-sanctioned torture violates
international law. The brief imprisonment and apparently technical assault and battery in
Underhill clearly did not rise to the level of torture.
41. Traditional common law reasoning emphasizes the importance of significant facts
underlying a court’s decision and whether a court actually addresses or was even aware of a
legal issue. The lower court opinion flunks both tests. Underhill involved alleged torts of
false imprisonment, assault, and battery committed in Venezuela by a Venezuelan official
against a United States citizen. Underhill, 65 F. at 578. There was no allegation whatsoever
that the defendant official violated international law. Moreover, lex loci delicti, the regnant
choice-of-law theory of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, dictated that the
plaintiff’s cause of action was governed entirely by Venezuelan law. See RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377–390 (1934).
Indeed, it probably was
unconstitutional to apply American tort law rather than Venezuelan law to the case. See
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930).
Underhill did not involve even a hint that the defendant may have violated
international law, and if the plaintiff had so pleaded the case, the action would have been
laughed out of court.
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relevant cases, they concluded that a federal common law doctrine exists,
and the doctrine is that the courts in particular cases should defer, or
perhaps are bound by, executive branch advice. 42 When Professors Bradley
and Goldsmith read the same meager materials, they agreed that a federal
common law doctrine already exists, but they divined an entirely different
rule. 43 They concluded that foreign officials are protected by a complete,
absolute immunity. 44 If the common law already exists, why is there such
obvious disagreement about the scope of its protection? Both the
professors’ and the government’s pronouncements regarding an extant
doctrine of immunity should be dismissed as misguided advocacy or
wishful thinking.
To repeat: there is no extant federal common law of foreign official
immunity. We long ago abandoned the now quaint notion that the common
law is “‘a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’” 45 In the wake of
Samantar, the courts are going to have to create an official immunity
doctrine, and the new doctrine should be shaped using the traditional
resources of common law courts. To the extent that the government and the
professors offer cogent policy considerations pertinent to law in the twentyfirst century, courts should pay careful attention.
B. The Jones Case
The British House of Lords has suggested that the concept of foreign
official immunity in ATS litigation is a rule or principle found in
international law. In Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia,46
Lords Bingham and Hoffmann wrote that foreign official immunity from
personal liability is a corollary of foreign sovereign immunity. Technically,
however, they were merely construing the British version of the United
States’ FSIA. 47 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Samantar, reached the
opposite conclusion with respect to the FSIA. In other words, Samantar
and Jones present a common occurrence in which two high courts
construing statutes from two different states reach superficially inconsistent
results. Some might read Jones as holding that foreign sovereign immunity
is mandated by international law—not domestic law—and that the
international law mandate includes a corollary that nations are required to
provide individual foreign officials with a tort defense of foreign official
immunity. 48

42. Brief for the United States, supra note 29, at 10–13, 27–28.
43. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 141.
44. Id.
45. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
46. [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
47. See Keitner, supra note 38, at 626–27.
48. See Jones, [2006] UKHL, ¶¶ 10–13 (Lord Bingham).
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The Jones case, however, does not hold that international law requires a
general doctrine of foreign official immunity. Although the Lords
discussed international law, the precise issue before them was whether
international law required that foreign officials be subject to liability, and
not whether international law required that foreign officials not be subject
to liability. 49 The closest the Lords came to specifically answering the
latter question is a statement that tort actions against foreign officials are
“perhaps not permitted by customary international law.” 50 This conjecture
is a far cry from holding that international law forbids ATS litigation.
C. Sovereign Immunity and Official Capacity
In developing a doctrine of foreign official immunity, the courts
inevitably will be hampered by the many meanings of the word
“immunity.” 51 For example, states have always been entitled to some form
of sovereign immunity, but there are at least four separate doctrines of
sovereign immunity under American law.52 As a matter of federal law, the
federal government is immune from suit in state and federal courts, and a
similar but separate federal doctrine protects the constituent states of the
federal republic from suit in federal court.53 The fifty states are also
immune from suit in their own courts, but this particular immunity is
largely controlled by state law. 54 As a matter of federal statutory law,
foreign states are immune from suit in state and federal court. 55 Finally, the
specific rules regulating these four categories of cases vary from category to
category. 56
The four categories of sovereign immunity are specialized subsets of the
general concept of subject matter jurisdiction. These four immunities
preclude courts from adjudicating claims against the protected states. A
dismissal does not address the lawfulness of the defendant’s actions or even
the defendant’s liability. Rather the dismissal is simply a determination that
the plaintiff has selected an inappropriate forum. 57 If an appropriate forum
is available, the claim may be refiled in that forum. 58

49. See generally Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669 (2011); Keitner, supra note 28.
50. Jones, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 58 (Lord Hoffmann) (emphasis added).
51. See generally RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841–941 (6th ed. 2009).
52. Id. ch. IX.
53. Id. ch. IX, §§ 1–2.
54. Id. at 928–36.
55. Id. at 768–71.
56. Id. ch. IX, 768–71.
57. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend . . . .” (emphasis added)).
58. Because sovereign immunity is a doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction, the first
court’s dismissal is not entitled to claim preclusive effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGEMENTS § 20(1)(a) (1982).
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Like the word “immunity,” the phrase “official capacity” 59 is a label that
is used to deal with several loosely related but significantly different
problems. In Samantar, the Court recognized that several lower courts had
held that the FSIA barred suits against individual officials.60 As a
consequence, these lower courts had to develop a set of rules to determine
when an official is entitled to sovereign immunity and when the official is
not. “For example,” the Supreme Court noted, “Courts of Appeals have
applied the rule that foreign sovereign immunity extends to an individual
official ‘for acts committed in his official capacity’ but not to ‘an official
who acts beyond the scope of his authority.’” 61
The phrase “official capacity” cropped up again after Samantar was
remanded to the trial court. The executive branch determined that Mr.
Samantar “does not enjoy immunity,” 62 and the trial judge struck the
The
defendant’s “common law sovereign immunity defense.” 63
government’s treatment of Samantar’s official immunity on remand is
confused and somewhat ambiguous. The Statement of Interest, or brief
filed by the Department of Justice, frequently confuses the clearly different
doctrines of sovereign immunity, act of state, and official immunity. 64
Cases involving these distinctly different doctrines are lumped together
willy-nilly and presented as establishing a rule of foreign official immunity.
More significantly, the State Department Legal Adviser’s letter obliquely
suggests that foreign officials “generally would enjoy only residual
immunity, unless waived, and even then only for actions taken in an official
The government’s post-remand Statement of Interest
capacity.” 65
apparently elaborates on this idea of an “official capacity” immunity by
explaining that “[f]ormer officials generally enjoy residual immunity for
acts taken in an official capacity while in office.” 66
59. Phrases like “scope of authority” or “scope of official authority” are sometimes used
instead of official capacity. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 49, at 2679–80. The Samantar
Court apparently equated official capacity with scope of authority. See, e.g., infra note 61
and accompanying text. This alternative label presents the same problems as official
capacity.
60. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.4 (2010).
61. Id. at 2291 n.17 (quoting Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103, 1106
(9th Cir. 1990)).
62. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at Exhibit 1, Yousuf v.
Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Interest]
(letter from Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh to Assistant Attorney
General Tony West).
63. See Order at 1, Yousuf v. Samantar, Civil Action No. 1:04 CV 1360 (E.D. Va. Feb.
15, 2011). The judge’s only explanation was that the “government has determined that the
defendant does not have foreign official immunity.” Id.
64. See Statement of Interest, supra note 62, at Exhibit 1.
65. Id. Apparently, the immunity is “residual” because Mr. Samantar no longer holds
any official position.
66. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The Statement later explains:
Because the immunity belongs to the state, and not the individual, and because
only actions by former officials taken in an official capacity are entitled to
immunity . . . the Executive Branch takes into account whether the foreign state
understood its official to have acted in an official capacity in determining a former
official’s immunity or non-immunity.
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In crafting a doctrine of foreign official immunity, the phrase “official
capacity” should be avoided like the plague. The problem is that the phrase
denotes two radically different concepts. First, for at least a century, a
tautology lay beneath the surface of American litigation against public
officers for misconduct in office. The tautology was: a state may not
lawfully authorize an officer to act unlawfully. 67 Following this rule, an
officer who violates the law is treated as a private citizen and is responsible
just as a private citizen is responsible. The second concept of official
capacity recognizes the obvious fact that many officers who violate the law
nevertheless are using authority granted by the state to further some interest
of the state. 68
The tautological concept of official capacity held sway in the nineteenth
century. Damages actions against government officers were treated as
ordinary tort actions, in which liability was premised on the tort rules
regulating a private citizen.69 Either the officer had acted unlawfully or not.
If the officer committed a tort, the officer was personally liable. If not, not.
For most of the nineteenth century, the idea of an official immunity
protecting unlawful misconduct was at best a nascent concept. 70
The tautology was also used in suits for injunctive relief. A well-known
example is found in Ex parte Young. 71 The Minnesota legislature had
enacted a measure to regulate railroad rates, and the shareholders of various
railroads sued in federal court to enjoin the state’s Attorney General from
enforcing the statute. 72 The plaintiffs argued that the statute violated the
federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. Before the Supreme Court,
the state’s Attorney General argued that a suit against him in his official
capacity to enjoin him from enforcing state law was a suit against the
state. 73 Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal courts from
adjudicating the case. 74 The Court disagreed, however. If the state
legislation violates the federal Constitution, the act could not confer lawful
enforcement authority on the Attorney General. 75 In accordance with the
tautology, the Attorney General “is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct.” 76 Notwithstanding this language, no one really

Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
67. See William R. Casto, Innovations in the Defense of Official Immunity Under
Section 1983, 47 TENN. L. REV. 47, 61–65 (1979).
68. See id. at 66–73.
69. See id. at 61–65; Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and
Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–22 (1987).
70. This approach began to shift with Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
71. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
72. See id. at 127–29.
73. See id. at 132.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 155–56.
76. Id. at 160.
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believes that Attorney General Young was simply a private citizen.77 The
legal fiction of Ex parte Young, however, has become a vital aspect of our
system of constitutional governance.78
The nineteenth-century tautology continues to play a vital role in suits for
injunctive relief, but it has been discarded in damage actions. By the
middle of the twentieth century, judges had come to believe that in order to
assure effective governance and individual fairness, some sort of protection
should be afforded to officers who violate the law. Initially, there was a
tendency to provide absolute immunity to public officers. 79 The idea of
general absolute immunity, however, was discarded after the Supreme
Court decided in Monroe v. Pape 80 that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided a broad
cause of action against state officers who violate the Constitution. In
response to the resulting flood of constitutional tort litigation, the Court
legislated a complex system of official immunities that constitutes a defense
for officers who have violated the Constitution.81
ATS litigation arises in a legal context that is radically different from the
traditional context of purely domestic litigation against government
officers. In traditional domestic litigation against officials, there is a clearly
defined hierarchy of laws. State laws are trumped by state constitutions,
and pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, all state laws are trumped by federal
law, including the federal constitution. This clear hierarchy dictates the
traditional answer to the conundrum of whether a state may lawfully
authorize an officer to act unlawfully. But there is no comparable hierarchy
in ATS litigation. International law and domestic law operate in two
separate realms that are, to a significant degree, independent of each other.
In their respective realms, international and domestic law are
simultaneously supreme. There is no Supremacy Clause to resolve conflicts
between domestic and international law. Since the time of Alexander
Hamilton, American lawyers—at least sophisticated ones—have understood
that as a matter of domestic law, a government may, if it chooses, lawfully
authorize a violation of international law. 82 When this happens, the
nation’s conduct is lawful under domestic law but unlawful under
international law. Therefore, the offending nation or officer would be
subject to the remedies of international law but not to remedies provided by
the domestic law of the officer’s country.

77. “The notion that the federal court injunctive relief operates only against the official
in an individual capacity is pure fiction.” 1A MARTIN SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 8.04[B] (4th ed. 2011).
78. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 51, at 891 (“Consider . . . whether constitutional
government would be workable if neither the states nor their officials were suable for
constitutional violations.”); 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, § 8.04[B] (“[Ex parte Young] is
one of the most important decisions ever rendered by the Supreme Court.”).
79. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 496 (1896). The leading cases were Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.), and Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
80. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
81. See infra notes 101–108 and accompanying text.
82. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF
FIGHTING SAIL 155–56 (2006).
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World War II was a watershed event in international law. For example,
the war resulted in a new model of the laws of neutrality. 83 The war also
sparked a change in the understanding of personal responsibility for
violations of international human rights. The Nuremberg trials “for the first
time made explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore, as the Tribunal
has declared, implicit in International Law, namely, . . . that for the
commission of [war] crimes individuals are responsible.” 84 We frequently
hear that obedience to superior orders was not a defense for the Nazi war
criminals, but the war criminals’ rejected defense went beyond simply
following superior orders. Hannah Arendt has pointed out that the Nazi war
criminals acted entirely consistently with their country’s constitutional
order. 85 In other words, many of the Nazi war crimes clearly and without
doubt were lawful under domestic German law. Nevertheless, the lawabiding officers were properly hanged or sent to prison for their violations
of international law.
The American courts’ distinction between official and private capacity
has been criticized as “unsound and even preposterous,” 86 and a
straightforward reading of the phrase “official capacity” renders the
distinction preposterous indeed. Some government torture may involve an
officer’s personal misconduct, but a significant amount of torture involves
abuse by officers who, like the Nazis, are merely following the law of their
country. It is absurd to say that these latter officers are not acting in their
official capacity. They obviously are.
In terms of the ordinary meaning of official capacity, the American
courts’ traditional distinction between official and private capacity clearly is
preposterous, but we have always understood this to be so. The distinction
quite clearly is a legal fiction shaped by a policy decision to favor the
enforcement of federal rights against government officers. The courts fully
understand that the officers may be acting in their official capacity in the
common sense meaning of the phrase. Nevertheless, the courts allow suits
against individual officers to go forward. The fiction is most evident in Ex
parte Young cases in which defendants are sued literally in their “official
capacity.”
The independent and parallel supremacy of domestic law and
international law in ATS litigation renders the traditional American
distinction between private and official capacity meaningless. In domestic
83. See William R. Casto, Advising Presidents: Robert H. Jackson and the Destroyersfor-Bases Deal, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. (forthcoming 2012).
84. Justice Jackson’s Final Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg War
Crimes Trial (1946), reprinted in 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338, 342 (1946). The ellipsis in this
quotation covers “to prepare, incite, or wage a war of aggression [and] to persecute, oppress,
or do violence to individuals or minorities on political, racial, or religious grounds in
connection with such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an
international crime.” Id.
85. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
292–94 (rev. ed. 1964).
86. Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International
Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 869
(2002).
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litigation, a state’s purported authorization of unconstitutional action is
rejected because a state may not lawfully authorize unlawful conduct. Ex
parte Young is the quintessential example. But in ATS litigation, a state
might—as a matter of domestic law—lawfully authorize its officers to
violate international law.
Many foreign countries are inclined in the context of ATS litigation to
issue a formal certification that an officer who is charged with violating
international law did so in the officer’s official capacity. In the Jones case,
Lord Bingham wrote, “There is . . . no suggestion that the defendants’
conduct was not in discharge or purported discharge of their public
duties.” 87 Similarly, the government of Israel has formally stated in ATS
litigation against its officers that “anything [the defendant] did . . . in
connection with the events at issue . . . was in the course of [his] official
duties, and in furtherance of official policies of the State of Israel.”88
There is an aspect of clever draftsmanship in some of the official capacity
certificates from foreign governments. When Saudi Arabia certifies that the
officers who allegedly tortured Ronald Jones acted in their official capacity,
is Saudi Arabia merely saying that prison wardens inevitably have contact
with prisoners and that sometimes a warden must use physical force against
prisoners? If this is a plausible reading of the certificate, the foreign
country’s submission is silent on the issue of official authority to violate
international law. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for
determining that violating international law was part of the officer’s official
duty.
But what if the officer’s government certifies, for example, that torture is
indeed the government’s official and lawful policy? Because a foreign
government is the best judge of the meaning and effect of its own laws, the
certification presumably would establish that the defendant officer had
literally acted lawfully and in compliance with his country’s domestic law.
In resolving the conundrum of official capacity in ATS litigation,
American courts should not apply the superficial rule of Ex parte Young but
should consider the metaprinciple behind cases like it. The courts should
consider the extent to which the United States wishes to give effect to the
policies embodied in clearly established rules of international law like the
rules against torture, non-judicial killings, slavery, and genocide. There
may be difficult foreign policy problems in some cases, but surely foreign
policy implications should be resolved in significant part by reference to
advice from the executive branch and not by a general rule of official
immunity. In any event, clear guidance from Congress has preempted the
problem of official capacity. Congress has enacted legislation such that an
ATS defendant is subject to personal liability even if the official is acting

87. Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C.
270 (H.L.) ¶ 11 (appeal taken from Eng.).
88. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 2009). For a similar Israeli statement in
another ATS case, see Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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pursuant to his government’s official and formal directive (i.e., with “actual
. . . authority”) to violate international law.89
D. Official Immunity in Constitutional Tort Litigation
A possible source of guidance in shaping the defense of foreign official
immunity is found in the system of official immunities that the Supreme
Court has created for constitutional tort litigation. Over the last half
century, the Court has elaborated a detailed and multifaceted doctrine of
official immunities that provides American officials with a defense against
tort claims. In these cases, the use of the word “immunity” is a misnomer.
The doctrine does not affect a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Official
immunity in this context is a defense on the merits.
In view of the obvious parallels between tort actions against American
officials and tort actions against foreign officials, there may be a temptation
to accord foreign officials the same protection that is afforded to their
American counterparts. Lacunae in the Samantar opinion suggest,
however, that the considerations implicated by suits against foreign officials
may be significantly different. The Court cited or discussed a few cases
involving foreign officials’ assertions of official immunity, 90 but the Court
never referred to the well-established official immunity accorded American
officials. Moreover, the Court’s opinion suggests that a State Department
recommendation is pertinent to a grant of official immunity. 91 The
complex and well-developed doctrine of official immunity for American
officials has nothing analogous to a State Department suggestion.
Furthermore, official immunity in ATS litigation implicates concerns
radically different from those implicated by § 1983 immunity. The
common law system of official immunity that the Supreme Court has
legislated for constitutional tort litigation92 is well known. 93 The general
contours of the system provide an absolute immunity to legislators, judges,
and prosecutors, but only a qualified immunity to most officers performing
executive branch functions. The system is very much a creature of
domestic law, designed specifically to regulate civil liability arising from
89. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006); see
infra notes 149–162 and accompanying text.
90. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–85 (2010) (citing Heaney v.
Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504–05 (2d Cir. 1971); Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F.
Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)); id. at 2290 (citing Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734,
1976 WL 841 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976)); id. at 2291 n.17 (citing Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l
Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also id. at 2291 n.18 (citing a study
that mentions four foreign official immunity cases).
91. Id. at 2291.
92. Constitutional tort litigation is founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in suits against state
officers and the Bivens doctrine in suits against federal officers. The system of official
immunities that the Court has developed is equally applicable, with one exception, to state
and federal officers. The protection accorded the President is sui generis. FALLON ET AL.,
supra note 51, at 997 n.1.
93. See generally 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 ch. 7–8 (4th ed. 2010); 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note
77, ch. 9–9A.
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American officers’ alleged misconduct in the United States. By definition,
the doctrine is rooted in American culture generally and especially in
American legal culture. Therefore, we should be dubious about blindly
applying this doctrine to the alleged misconduct of foreign officers in
foreign countries.
In the United States, the separation of powers is a fundamental concept of
constitutional government that limits the abuse of government authority.
American executive officials know that their actions are subject to review
by an independent judiciary and to political control by an independent
legislature. Many other countries, however, have no comparable concept.
For example, when the Republic of China was sued in federal court during
the Reagan Administration, Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from
1978 to 1992, reportedly told Secretary of State Shultz, “Why don’t you
just call that judge down in Alabama and tell him to lay off the People’s
Republic of China.” 94 Shultz said, “Oh, we have the separation of powers,
you have to understand.” 95 Deng was puzzled and replied, “Well, what is
the separation of powers?” 96
Moreover, the specific major policy considerations giving rise to official
immunity in constitutional tort litigation are quite attenuated in ATS
litigation. The domestic system of immunities, especially the qualified
immunity of executive branch officers, is largely a function of two separate
and distinct considerations. The Supreme Court has explained that “it
cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent
as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to
society as a whole.” 97 Accordingly, the domestic system of immunities
stems from concerns about the impact of specific lawsuits on specific
innocent 98 officers and the impact of the general availability of damages
remedies upon the effective functioning of government. 99 Neither of these
concerns, however, are significantly implicated by ATS litigation.
Insofar as fairness to particular individual American defendants is
concerned, the Court has focused upon the problem of officers being held
liable for unconstitutional misconduct that they may not have known was
unconstitutional: “If the law [when the defendant injured the plaintiff] was
not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to
94. MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 44
(2010) (statement of Reagan Administration State Department Legal Adviser Davis
Robinson).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); accord Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194–96 (1984).
98. Even if the defendant officer ultimately is found at trial not to have violated the
Constitution, the officer was still subject to the wear and tear of the litigation process,
including “‘the costs of trial [and] the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.’” Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18).
99. Id. (noting that the costs of such litigation include the “‘distraction of officials from
their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people
from public service’” (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816)).
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anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to
‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as
unlawful.” 100 In other words, the doctrine of qualified immunity addresses
the historical fact in American society that constitutional law changes from
time to time. This problem of mutability, however, is not present in ATS
litigation. The Supreme Court has held that “courts should require any
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity.” 101 No one should be allowed to claim that they did not know
that torture, non-judicial killing, slavery, or genocide violates international
law. 102
The other consideration giving rise to official immunity is the costs of
litigation to society as a whole. These costs “include the expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and
the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”103 In
addition, there is the danger that “fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in
the unflinching discharge of their duties.’” 104
The costs to society in constitutional tort litigation are enormous due to
the sheer volume of cases that are filed each year. The United States’
domestic doctrine of official immunity is in large measure a response to
Monroe v. Pape, 105 in which the Supreme Court gave an expansive
interpretation to the remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The result
was “an impressive flood of litigation against state officers in the federal
courts.” 106 The author can remember quipping in the 1970s to Alfred Hill,
his dissertation adviser, that “Monroe might be the case that launches a
thousand suits and topples the countless towers of officialdom.” Supreme
Court justices agreed. In discussing the need for a doctrine of official
immunity, then-Justice Rehnquist explained that his “biggest concern . . . is
not with the illogic or impracticality of today’s decision, but rather with the
potential for disruption of Government that it invites.”107 Rehnquist
continued, “The steady increase in litigation, much of it directed against
governmental officials and virtually all of which could be framed in
constitutional terms, cannot escape the notice of even the most casual
observer.” 108
100. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
101. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); see also id. at 732.
102. To be sure, there will be gray areas in each of these categories of proscribed conduct.
The problem of gray areas should be dealt with through the requirement that the international
norm must be defined with specificity. See Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 652–54.
103. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
104. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
105. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
106. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 (2d ed. 1973); see PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1242–43 (3d ed. 1988).
107. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
108. Id.
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Just as the high volume of constitutional tort litigation cannot be denied,
it is common knowledge that the actual volume of ATS litigation is quite
low. We have had ATS litigation for over thirty years, and there has been
no avalanche of litigation that might threaten the effective governance of
foreign countries. The rarity of ATS litigation is not a statistical anomaly.
An American court cannot gain personal jurisdiction over a foreign official
unless the official has minimum contacts with the United States.109
Because foreign officials rarely visit the United States, they rarely are
suable in the United States. Therefore, the costs to society of ATS litigation
are marginal. Does anyone believe that the judgment in Filartiga has
deterred able citizens of Paraguay from joining the police or has dampened
the ardor of Paraguayan police officers? At most, the judgment may have
deterred Paraguayan torturers from coming to the United States on vacation.
II. FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AS A COROLLARY
TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The strongest case for granting immunity in ATS litigation is when the
remedy sought is, in effect, actually against a foreign state. This type of
immunity, however, should not be confused with an officer’s immunity
from personal liability. The ALI’s 1965 Second Restatement provided that
a foreign state’s sovereign immunity “extends to . . . any other public
minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his
official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a
rule of law against the state.” 110 The ALI viewed this section’s proviso as
crucial: these agents of the state “do not have immunity from personal
liability even for acts carried out in their official capacity” unless the suit is
actually against the state.111 The Second Restatement’s rule of immunity is
not really a rule of official immunity. The ALI presented the rule as an
elaboration of sovereign immunity and indicated that if the remedy runs
directly against the state, there is sovereign immunity. 112 But if the suit
involves the official’s “personal liability,” sovereign immunity is not
implicated. 113
A clear example of a suit against an officer that actually “enforce[s] a
rule of law against the state” is an action seeking injunctive relief. There is,
however, much less here than meets the eye. As a practical matter, and
without regard to official immunity, an ATS suit for injunctive relief is
highly unlikely to arise or go forward. The general ATS problem of
109. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66(f) (1965) (emphasis added). The 1987 Restatement has no comparable provision. The
reason for the deletion is unclear. Perhaps the ALI Reporters believed that FSIA occupied
the field. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 451–466 (1987). The first generation of Restatements did not cover foreign
relations law.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66(f) cmt. b.
112. Id.; see also id. § 66(f) cmt. b, illus. 2–4.
113. Id. § 66(f) cmt. b; see also id. § 66(f) cmt. b, illus. 2–3.
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obtaining personal jurisdiction will persist. Moreover, as a general matter
of equity jurisprudence, an American judge is quite unlikely to issue an
injunction that will require the judge to supervise compliance in a foreign
country. 114
In any event, a suit for injunctive relief is obviously a suit against the
state and only coincidentally a suit against the individual officer. We
indulge a legal fiction in the United States that a suit to enjoin an officer
from violating federal law is not a suit against a state and therefore not
barred by sovereign immunity. To repeat, however, no one actually
believes that the state is not the real defendant in these injunction suits. The
Supreme Court created this legal fiction to give practical meaning to
individual rights guaranteed by federal law. These cases involve the
enforcement of U.S. laws against governments in the United States for
actions taken in the United States. The fiction should not be indulged when
international law is enforced against foreign governments for actions taken
overseas. Indulging the fiction in suits to enjoin a foreign state’s activities
would fly in the teeth of FSIA.
In addition to injunction cases, if a judgment for damages will run
directly against a foreign state, the suit is barred and must be dismissed
unless it falls within an FSIA exception. 115 Some may argue that if a
foreign state has agreed to indemnify its officer in ATS litigation, the suit
should be treated as, in essence, a suit against the state. 116 There may be a
superficial appeal to this argument, but the argument should be rejected. In
the first place, there is a smoke-and-mirrors aspect to the indemnification
argument. If it is correct, the state’s agreement to indemnify is illusory. As
soon as indemnification is offered, the suit would be dismissed with the
result that the state is left with no indemnification obligation.117
The indemnification argument has been made in a number of
constitutional tort actions involving state officials. States are protected by
sovereign immunity in constitutional tort actions just as foreign countries
are accorded sovereign immunity in ATS litigation. In the former cases,
“every court that has considered the issue has rejected, rightly in our view,
the argument that an indemnity statute brings the Eleventh Amendment into
play.” 118 The courts have concluded that the decision to indemnify is a
voluntary decision and is not imposed by judicial decree.
Some have worried that indemnification may wreak havoc on a foreign
country’s finances, 119 but the facts do not support this theoretical concern.
114. See, e.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 716–17 (2d Cir. 2004).
115. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).
116. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 148–49.
117. “A government may not manufacture immunity for its employees by agreeing to
indemnify them.” Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 512 n.6 (6th Cir. 1985).
118. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1985). Cases decided since
Duckworth are in accord. See 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, § 8.10[B][2]. For two
conflicting decisions of foreign courts on the issue of indemnification, see Keitner, supra
note 28, at 5.
119. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 148–49.
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First, it is not clear whether foreign countries actually indemnify their
officers. 120 Moreover, a country surely would not indemnify an officer who
has been found to have tortured people to death. Finally, as a technical
matter, there is no indemnification obligation until an officer actually pays
money over to someone. As a practical matter, virtually all officers held
liable in ATS litigation will be either judgment-proof or have no assets in
the United States to satisfy a judgment. Therefore, any indemnification
obligation, if there actually is one, likely will be limited to litigation costs.
The cost of defending a Saudi Arabian torturer or a Paraguayan torturer
surely would not bankrupt those two nations.
A final example of suits actually against the state involves contractual
disputes with a foreign state. Through artful pleading it may be possible to
allege a claim against an individual officer that will, as a practical matter,
provide a remedy for the plaintiff’s contract dispute. 121 These cases of
artful pleading would eventually be dismissed on the merits. An earlier
dismissal on official immunity grounds would spare the individual
defendant the needless pain and agony of pretrial and trial litigation. Of
course, it is difficult to see how a contract claim could be turned into an
ATS claim. 122
III. CREATING A DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
In thinking about the proper scope of foreign official immunity, a
preliminary issue arises as to whether it is appropriate to accord foreign
officials less protection than American domestic law would provide to
American officials who violate international law. To tinker with an old
expression, perhaps what is sauce for the domestic goose is sauce for the
foreign gander. Put another way, how can we justify a system of laws that
protects American officials who torture people but does not protect foreign
officials who do the same thing?
The answer is simply put: Congress has forbidden the courts from
according like treatment to American and foreign officials. As a matter of
domestic federal law, the personal liability of federal officers who violate
international law is entirely different from the personal liability of foreign
officers. The liability of federal officers is almost entirely regulated by an
extant act of Congress that does not apply to foreign officers. In sharp
120. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith try to finesse this issue by extrapolating from
anecdotal U.S. practice. Id. at 148. Whether governments in the United States routinely
indemnify their officers is far from clear. More significantly, it is difficult to believe that an
American city or state would indemnify a police officer if a court has determined that the
officer tortured someone to death. Moreover, we should not blindly assume that a foreign
country will follow U.S. practice.
121. For example, in Samantar, the Court cited Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d
501 (2d Cir. 1971), where the plaintiff had a contractual dispute with the Government of
Spain and sued both Spain and a Spanish consul who signed the contract. See Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–85 (2010); see also Keitner, supra note 28, at 12 (citing
Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379 (H.L) (appeal taken from Eng.)).
These cases obviously do not involve remedies for violation of international law.
122. See Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 665 n.159.
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contrast, the liability of foreign officers—at least the issue of foreign
official immunity—is regulated by a common law doctrine to be developed
by the courts without direct congressional guidance.
The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of
1988 123 (Westfall Act) governs the liability of federal officers sued in ATS
litigation. 124 In the Westfall Act, Congress balanced two important but
competing goals. First was the need to provide a remedy for individuals
who had suffered harm as a result of government officers’ tortious
activities. At the same time, Congress sought to provide officers with
protection from personal liability. The Act balances these two concerns by
substituting the liability of the United States for the personal liability of the
officer. Under the Act, a suit against a federal officer acting within the
officer’s scope of employment is converted into a suit against the United
States by dropping the individual defendant from the suit and substituting
the United States as the sole defendant. 125 This congressional decision
effectively immunizes federal officers who may be sued for violating
international law. Therefore, there will never be an occasion or need to
develop a common law doctrine of official immunity for ATS suits against
American officers. At the same time, an individual who has suffered harm
at the hands of the government is not left without a remedy. Under the
Westfall Act, the United States remains immune from liability for an
American officer’s misconduct overseas.126 But ATS litigation typically
does not involve misconduct outside the officer’s home country. If a
federal police officer did in the United States what the Paraguayan police
officer did in the Filartiga case, the United States would be subject to
liability. 127
In contrast to situations governed by the Westfall Act, Congress has not
enacted a statute that overtly balances a victim’s and a foreign official’s
interests. 128 Therefore, the courts will have to fashion a system of
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006).
124. See Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 662–64.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; see Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 662–64.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
127. Filartiga involved a Paraguayan police officer torturing a person to death in the
officer’s home country. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). If a federal
law enforcement officer tortured a person to death in the United States, the federal officer
would be subject to liability for the tort of battery. The United States would be substituted as
a defendant, and the case would proceed forward as an FTCA case. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
Although the FTCA exempts the United States from liability in a number of situations, none
of the exemptions would seem to apply. The foreign tort exemption, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), is
not relevant because the tort occurred in the United States—just like the tort in Filartiga.
The intentional tort exemption would not apply because the exemption is not applicable in
cases involving police misconduct. Id. § 2680(h). There is, of course, another exemption for
discretionary acts, id. § 2680(a), but it seems unlikely that a court would hold that torturing
someone to death is a discretionary act.
Limiting the above hypothetical to federal misconduct that occurs within the United
States is quite appropriate. In fact, virtually all ATS suits against foreign officials involve
misconduct in the official’s home country.
128. At least, there is no legislation creating a system of immunities for foreign officers.
The only congressional guidance comes in the TVPA, which surely precludes a rule of
general immunity. See infra notes 149–167 and accompanying text.
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immunities without direct Congressional guidance. In shaping this system
of immunities, the courts might consider adopting the Westfall Act
principle as federal common law, 129 but Congress has specifically
forbidden the courts from doing so. The linchpin of the Westfall Act is the
substitution of the government as a defendant with a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity. By enacting FSIA, Congress has outlawed the
substitution of a foreign state.
Even if the technicality of the Westfall Act did not exist, bedrock
principles of American constitutional law nevertheless would support the
disparate treatment of foreign and American officials. As a matter of
domestic law, U.S. courts probably would strain to avoid judicial review of
torture sanctioned by the President. Some have argued that the Constitution
confers upon the President a plenary power to set aside or ignore subconstitutional laws like acts of Congress, treaties, common law, and of
course international law. 130 As Richard Nixon famously said, “When the
President does it, that means that it is not illegal.” 131 These theorists of
plenary presidential power apparently see the President’s sound judgment
as the principal limitation to this unusual power. Presumably, these
theorists also see the political process writ large as an important limitation.
If the theorists of plenary presidential power are correct, the personal
liability of a foreign official is entirely different from the liability of an
American official acting with the President’s sanction. In ATS litigation,
remedial issues like the availability of a damages remedy or official
immunity are governed by domestic, sub-constitutional law.132 There is no
doubt that the Constitution confers some scope of plenary authority upon
the President, 133 but as a matter of domestic law, these unique presidential
powers are by definition sui generis. The Constitution in no way confers
such power upon foreign governments. Given the President’s unique status
under our domestic law, the liability of foreign officials under our domestic
law is entirely different from the liability of American officials acting
pursuant to presidential directions.
Using the President’s sui generis constitutional status to distinguish
between the personal liability of American officials and foreign officials is,
to be sure, a fairly technical legal distinction. Nevertheless, given the
Constitution’s primacy, the distinction is valid. Of course, the present
author vehemently denies that the Constitution authorizes the President to
129. See Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 661–62.
130. See, for example, the Justice Department’s notorious torture memorandum discussed
in William R. Casto, Executive Advisory Opinions and the Practice of Judicial Deference in
Foreign Affairs Cases, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 501, 503–05 (2005).
131. See Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16 [hereinafter Nixon Excerpts].
132. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289–93 (2010) (official immunity); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (remedy).
133. See, for example, the admirable, even awesome, discussion of the President’s
commander-in-chief powers in David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121
HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008), and David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008).
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become a hopefully benevolent dictator. For me, this distinction is quite
unpalatable.
There is, however, a more palatable distinction between the personal
liability of foreign and American officials. The distinction arises from the
nature of the political process in the United States and in particular from our
commitment to the electoral process and the concept of separation of
powers. As Richard Nixon explained, even the President’s power is subject
to the electoral process.134 While this process cannot curb a second-term
President, the President remains—as Nixon discovered—subject to a less
structured but equally potent political process.
In contrast to American officials, foreign officials frequently are not
subject to the amorphous yet nevertheless powerful political constraints that
we have in the United States. In particular, many countries in the world
lack anything approaching a vibrant electoral process and have no
commitment whatsoever to the concept of separation of powers. As Deng
Xiaoping said, “[W]hat is the separation of powers?” 135 Does anyone
believe that the governments of Paraguay and Saudi Arabia felt any
significant domestic political heat over the torture of Joelito Filártiga 136 and
Ronald Jones? 137 Given the absence of powerful political constraints
comparable to the ones in our society, an American court might
appropriately accord more protection to American officials than to foreign
officials.
This distinction between the United States and Paraguay or Saudi Arabia
should not be viewed as a version of American exceptionalism. There are
countries other than the United States with a robust political culture and a
commitment to separation of powers. Perhaps officials from these latter
countries should be treated the same as American officials. As a practical
matter, however, courts are not well equipped to make judgments about the
political culture of a foreign country. Fortunately, courts do not have to
make this political judgment. Any concept of foreign official immunity
almost certainly will include some provision for State Department
recommendations, and the political culture of a foreign country could
reasonably factor into the State Department’s decision making.
A. Absolute Immunity
Some have argued that in ATS litigation, foreign officials generally
should receive an absolute official immunity. 138 To a degree, this argument
for absolute immunity is distorted by the patently erroneous assertion that a
common law doctrine of absolute immunity already exists.139 In addition,

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Nixon Excerpts, supra note 131.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19–20.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 137–38.
See supra notes 23–45 and accompanying text.
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however, the argument for absolute immunity is based upon public policy
considerations and congressional policy. 140
The United States inherited a faith in legislative supremacy from the
English, and this faith, with some New World changes, is ingrained in our
understanding of the law. In particular, when federal courts make federal
common law, a well-regarded Supreme Court Justice has advised that
where there is a pertinent statute, the common law should be “appropriate to
effectuate the policy of the governing Act.”141 The Court as a whole has
agreed: “Some [federal common law issues] will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy.” 142 Similarly, the
Court has said with specific reference to ATS litigation that “the general
practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law.” 143
Experience under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 presents a good example of the
influence of statutory policy upon the crafting of federal common law.
Some forty years ago, the Supreme Court began the task of creating a
common law of official immunity for litigation under this statutory cause of
action. The Court rejected a general rule of absolute immunity. Given the
statutory policy of liability, “government officials, as a class, could not be
totally exempt, by virtue of some absolute immunity, from liability under its
terms.” 144 If the Court created a general rule of absolute immunity, “§ 1983
would be drained of meaning.” 145
Supporters of a general rule of absolute immunity argue that FSIA
establishes a policy of immunity, 146 but this argument makes no sense.
FSIA is literally silent on the personal liability of foreign officials. The
Court expressly held in Samantar that the statute “does not address an
official’s claim to immunity.” 147 Put another way, “[t]he immunity of
officials simply was not the particular problem to which Congress was
responding when it enacted the FSIA.” 148
In contrast to FSIA’s deafening silence, TVPA stands as a clear
statement of congressional policy in ATS litigation. Congress explicitly
considered the personal liability of foreign torturers and enacted a statutory
cause of action against those officials. Moreover, Congress clearly intended
a broad scope of liability by using well-known terms of art to describe the
scope of conduct covered by the statute. The TVPA provides that an
“individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
140. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 145–51.
141. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
142. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
143. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004).
144. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974).
145. Id. at 248; accord Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501, 503–04 (1978); see also
Wuerth, supra note 9, at 974–75.
146. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 145–47.
147. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010).
148. Id. at 2291.
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foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual.”149 These terms of art have clear
meanings, and Congress’s explicit adoption of these terms evidences a
broad scope of liability.
The phrase “under color of law” comes from constitutional tort litigation.
In the leading case, the Supreme Court explained that the phrase means
“‘[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”150
In the context of ATS litigation, the phrase creates liability for foreign
officials who misuse their power and violate international law without the
government’s permission or authority. This is the natural reading of the
phrase “color of law” and the reading actually intended by the TVPA’s
drafters. 151
If “color of law” addresses unauthorized misuse of power, “actual or
apparent authority” must address some other form of misconduct. It is a
sad fact of life that “in practice more than one-third of the world’s
governments engage in, tolerate, or condone [torture].” 152 Because color of
law was developed primarily to deal with officers acting without the
permission of their governments, the phrase “actual or apparent authority”
would seem to extend liability to officers whose governments embrace and
even formally authorize torture. For decades every American law student in
the United States has been taught that the phrase “actual or apparent
authority” has a well-known, black letter law meaning. It literally is
hornbook law. 153 For almost a century, the ALI’s Restatement of Agency
has been using this distinction between authority and apparent authority.154
Moreover, the drafters of the TVPA reported that the statutory phrase
“actual and apparent authority” was “derived from agency theory in order to
give the fullest coverage possible.” 155
The black letter law of actual authority is clear: “An agent acts with
actual authority when . . . the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with
the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the
agent so to act.” 156 In the context of TVPA litigation, the agent is the
149. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
150. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
151. “Courts should look to principles of liability under U.S. civil rights laws, in
particular section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, in construing ‘under color of
law’ . . . .” S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991). Similarly, the House Report states that
“[c]ourts should look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is [sic] construing ‘color of law.’” H.R. REP. NO.
102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87.
152. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
153. See, e.g., HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 14, 23 (1979).
154. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY §§ 7–8 (1933).
155. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8. Similarly, the House Report states that “[c]ourts should
look to . . . agency law in construing ‘actual or apparent authority.’” H.R. REP. NO. 102-367,
at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87.
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 7 (1958); RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY §§ 7–8.
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foreign official and the principal is that official’s government. Accordingly,
the TVPA explicitly extends liability to cases in which the defendant’s
government has approved, endorsed, or authorized the act of torture.157
This category of officially sanctioned torture includes—to use the words of
the TVPA committee report—the “one-third of the world’s governments
[that] engage in, tolerate, or condone [torture].” 158 The “color of law”
phrase extends liability to officials whose governments do not endorse
torture.
Because the concepts of actual authority and color of law seem to cover
the waterfront, one wonders what apparent authority encompasses. Early
hearings on a bill that eventually became the TVPA suggest that apparent
authority would extend liability to private persons who act in concert with
the government. For example, “[w]hen you talk about death squads in El
Salvador, you may be talking about people who have no direct contact with
the government, no provable official contact.” 159
The express words of the statute clearly extend liability to torture without
regard to whether the defendant officer was acting in accordance with
express laws and official policy of the officer’s country or was merely
following orders. Moreover, the statute’s drafters seem 160 to have intended
157. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
158. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
159. The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup on H.R. 1417 Before the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomm. on Human Rights & Int’l Orgs., 100th Cong.
76 (1988) [hereinafter TVPA House Hearings] (testimony of Michael H. Posner, Executive
Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights). Similarly, Father Robert Drinan
suggested that apparent authority addresses the situation where a foreign state says, “[W]e
never, never authorized this torture. But if the individual [torturer] involved said that: I felt
that it was authorized and I did it because I felt that they were—then that particular case
should be reachable under this law.” Id. Other documents quoted in this early hearing make
the same point that the “proposed statute incorporates the concept of ‘actual or apparent
authority’ to avoid this dilemma by providing courts with jurisdiction over state-authorized
as well as state-condoned abuses.” Id. at 110 (quoting Matthew H. Murray, Note, The
Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation to Promote Enforcement of the Human Rights of
Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 700 (1987)).
160. Some members of the Court are leery of legislative history. See, e.g., Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2293–94 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2293 (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. (Thomas, J., concurring). For those who are not leery, the legislative history
indicates an intent to provide “the fullest coverage possible.” See supra note 155 and
accompanying text. This message, however, is somewhat garbled by the following passage:
To avoid liability by invoking the FSIA, a former official would have to prove an
agency relationship to a state, which would require that the state “admit some
knowledge or authorization of relevant acts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). Because all
states are officially opposed to torture and extrajudicial killing, however, the FSIA
should normally provide no defense to an action taken under the TVPA against a
former official.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991); see 138 CONG. REC. 4176–77 (1992). This snippet flies in
the face of the statutory language and the rest of the TVPA’s legislative history.
The snippet’s reference to FSIA and citation of § 1603(b) indicates a belief that
under some circumstances a former official could be considered an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” if the foreign state formally embraced torture. The
Supreme Court in Samantar, however, unanimously rejected the application of the FSIA to
actions against foreign officials in their personal capacity. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. The
snippet is based upon bad law and should not be used to override the clear meaning of the
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this broad scope of liability. To repeat: the TVPA’s drafters explained that
the reference to agency concepts was intended “to give the fullest coverage
possible.” 161 In particular, “low-level officials cannot escape liability by
claiming that they were acting under orders of superiors.” 162 Nor may
superiors escape liability by claiming that torture is lawful under their
country’s domestic laws.
Finally, supporters of a general rule of absolute immunity have adduced
some generally phrased policy considerations in support of their position.
These glittering generalities do not, however, comport with the facts on the
ground in ATS litigation. 163 For example, the supporters advance as their
statutory language. Even if the snippet were followed, it would not be applicable unless the
foreign state gave a clear statement that under the foreign state’s domestic law, the officer
was lawfully authorized to engage in torture or extrajudicial killing.
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. Another aspect of the TVPA’s
legislative history lends further support to an intent to provide the fullest coverage possible.
The Act originated in the 100th Congress as H.R. 1417. See TVPA House Hearings, supra
note 159, at 81–83. In this original bill, the scope of liability was limited to “actual or
apparent authority” with no mention of color of law. Id. at 82. In the next Congress, the
House Bill (H.R. 1662) retained the original language of “actual or apparent authority,” but
the Senate Bill (S. 1629) substituted “color of law” for “actual or apparent authority.” See
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary and its Subcomm. on Immigration & Refugee Affairs, 101st Cong.
2–3, 4–7 (1990). Finally, in the 102nd Congress, the House approved H.R. 2092, which
provided for liability for conduct under either “actual or apparent authority or under color of
law.” See Consideration of Miscellaneous Bills and Resolutions: Markup Before the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. 175–82 (1991). This language was enacted.
162. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9.
163. For example, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith argue that creating a doctrine of
official immunity will require U.S. courts to balance “complicated domestic social tradeoffs”
involving “different legal and political cultures” in foreign nations. Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 28, at 148. The nature of the underlying rights in ATS litigation easily cuts
through this Gordian Knot. ATS litigation is limited to a few clearly defined international
rights like freedom from torture, non-judicial killing, genocide, and slavery. One wonders
about the legitimacy of a foreign political culture that seeks to protect the perpetrators of
such atrocious misconduct. In any event, the congressional policy judgment embodied in the
TVPA trumps this concern.
The professors also worry that foreign nations may indemnify foreign officers,
which will result in financial hardship.
“Foreign nations,” the professors say,
“understandably do not trust U.S. courts to manage their public administration and fiscal
matters.” Id. at 149. But to repeat, indemnification is not required. It is voluntary. See supra
notes 116–120 and accompanying text.
The professors also worry that international law is too vague, and the Supreme Court
is not a “definitive interpreter” of international law. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at
149. They suggest that the Court’s interpretations of international law are “idiosyncratic.”
Id. To be sure, much of international law is vague, and the Court does, indeed, lack final
legislative authority in this area, see Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 641–42, but the
scope of rights enforced in ATS litigation is quite narrow, and by definition well-defined. Is
it idiosyncratic to say that torture, non-judicial killing, slavery, and genocide are contrary to
international law? The professors merge the right to be remedied and the remedy in ATS
litigation. They say that the U.S. practice of providing a damage remedy “is viewed outside
the United States as illegitimate and indeed as contrary to international law.” Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 149. The fact remains, however, that Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the executive branch have decided that a remedy should be available. The fact
that some people outside the United States may dislike these policy decisions cannot justify
overturning these decisions in the guise of absolute official immunity.
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“most fundamental” argument the impact of ATS litigation on foreign
relations. They argue that “without clear political branch guidance, [the
courts should not] pursue a course of action in litigation that threatens
international discord.” 164 As a general proposition, this argument makes
some sense, but by its own terms, the argument collapses when the political
branches have provided clear guidance.
In the TVPA, Congress created a cause of action against foreign torturers
without regard to whether they exceeded their authority or tortured pursuant
to clear and otherwise lawful government policy. In signing the TVPA into
law, the President agreed with this explicit policy. Finally, the executive
branch, through the State Department’s Legal Adviser and the Attorney
General, has often lent its support to ATS litigation. Indeed, in the
government’s Samantar amicus brief, the Attorney General and the Legal
Adviser implicitly rejected a general rule of absolute immunity and argued
instead for a rule of immunity significantly based upon the executive
branch’s ad hoc suggestion of immunity in individual cases.165
Of course, the TVPA, by its terms, is limited to torture and nonjudicial
killing and therefore does not apply to common law ATS litigation
involving slavery and genocide. Nevertheless, as a matter of common law
reasoning, the TVPA’s principle of broad liability should be adopted for
ATS claims outside the TVPA’s technical scope. By tradition, U.S. courts
in certain situations have adopted legislative wisdom as a common law
principle for the resolution of common law issues not technically governed
by the pertinent statute.166 Moreover, it would be passing strange if the
federal courts created a general principle of liability that is more solicitous
of slavers and perpetrators of genocide than of torturers and nonjudicial
killers. In the context of ATS litigation, the distinction between torture and
nonjudicial killing on the one hand and slavery and genocide on the other is
illusive. 167
B. The Proper Scope of Official Immunity
If foreign officials should not receive a general absolute immunity, what
scope of immunity should they receive? Traditional rules of official
immunity involve a principled approach in which courts apply general rules
Finally, the professors argue that an ATS remedy is not necessary because there may
be “civil or criminal liability in the home country.” Id. at 150. One wonders if they actually
think that Paraguay and Saudi Arabia would provide a remedy for the torture of Joelito
Filártiga and Ronald Jones. What about the one-third of nations that embrace torture? See
supra note 152 and accompanying text. To be sure, some foreign nations may provide
meaningful remedies for violations of international law. See Casto, Common Law, supra
note 5, at 659. A general rule of absolute immunity, however, is too blunt an instrument to
deal with the existence of remedies in an ATS plaintiff’s home country. The TVPA’s
concept of exhaustion of remedies is more finely calibrated to address this specific concern.
See id. at 660–61.
164. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 150.
165. Brief for the United States, supra note 29, at 8–28.
166. See Casto, Common Law, supra note 5, at 660–62.
167. This is not to say, however, that ad hoc political considerations might not lead to
disparate treatment in particular cases.
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to specific cases, but none of the traditional, principled approaches fit ATS
litigation. A general absolute immunity is contrary to pertinent acts of
Congress, judicial precedent, and the views of the executive. The qualified
immunity used in constitutional tort litigation will not work because ATS
cases, by definition, involve a narrow range of well-known norms like
torture, non-judicial killing, slavery, and genocide.
Similarly, the concept of official capacity is of little value because it is
based upon a legal fiction that simply does not fit ATS litigation. If official
immunity turns on whether the defendant acted in an official capacity, the
defense is either too broad or too narrow. In the United States, we pretend
that an officer who acts unlawfully is not acting in an official capacity.
Adopting this legal fiction in ATS litigation would, in effect, eliminate
official immunity because torturers, murderers, slavers, and fomenters of
genocide are by definition acting unlawfully. On the other hand, if official
capacity is construed to encompass conduct related to the defendant’s jobs,
virtually all ATS defendants would be protected.
Professor Beth Stephens has suggested that the defense of foreign official
immunity will inevitably turn on a number of ad hoc factors or
considerations. 168 Her suggestion should be followed. There will be little
predictability to this approach, but torturers and murderers have no valid
reliance interest. In reaching ad hoc conclusions in particular cases, none of
the relevant factors should be conclusive in all cases.
1. The Defendant Officer’s Government
If the defendant’s government is unwilling to certify that the defendant’s
actions were authorized, the defense of official immunity ordinarily should
not be available. There is some confusion, however, about the reason for
this conclusion. Some have argued that the purpose of official immunity is
to protect the interests of foreign states. Thus, the United States’ brief to
the Supreme Court in Samantar noted that “a foreign state may seek to
waive the immunity . . . because immunity is accorded to foreign officials
not for their personal benefit, but for the benefit of the foreign state.” 169
Statements like this should not be read literally. Actually, the defense of
official immunity is based primarily on the foreign policy interests of the
United States and not directly on the interests of a foreign government.
Usually the United States’ foreign policy interests will at least partially be
furthered by supporting the announced preference of the foreign
government, but this will not always be the case.
Suppose, for example, that the United States has given strong support to
a particular government, but that government has been ousted. Or suppose
that the United States arranges for a particular government to abdicate in
order to avoid a violent and bloody revolution. In each example, the new
government might wish to waive the deposed officers’ official immunity.
168. See Stephens, supra note 49, at 2709.
169. Brief for the United States, supra note 29, at 26; see also Statement of Interest, supra
note 62, at Exhibit 1.
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The United States may recognize the new government, yet for foreign
policy reasons might recommend official immunity for the deposed
officers.
2. Executive Branch
Although executive branch recommendations regarding official
immunity should not be conclusive, 170 the executive nevertheless inevitably
will play an important role in judicial determinations of official immunity.
In making recommendations, the executive inevitably will be guided by
political or policy considerations rather than legal principles. Experience
with somewhat similar State Department recommendations, before
Congress enacted the FSIA, is instructive. In 1952, the United States
adopted a restrictive approach to foreign sovereign immunity that
recognized a commercial transaction exception, and for the next twentyfour years, the courts relied upon executive judgment to determine whether
a particular suit fell within the exception.171 The working assumption was
that the executive was administering a legal principle—the commercial
transaction exception. Congress eventually became dissatisfied with
leaving the matter to the executive branch. Among other things, “foreign
nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department . . . . [O]n
occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases
where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive
[commercial transaction] theory.” 172 There is no reason to expect that
experience in respect of executive recommendations regarding official
immunity will be any different.
Actually, political considerations will play an even greater role in respect
of official immunity than they did regarding pre-FSIA determinations of
sovereign immunity. In advising the courts before the FSIA, the executive
was ostensibly administering a principled legal exception to sovereign
immunity. In the case of official immunity, there is no principled basis for
the executive to premise its analysis of the issue. The concepts of absolute
and qualified immunity will not work. Nor is the notion of official capacity
of any use.
The absence of a legal principle to guide the executive in its
recommendations does not mean that executive recommendations are
entirely a function of raw politics. For example, on remand in Samantar,
the executive based its recommendation against official immunity on the
fact that the defendant’s native country of Somalia currently has two
separate governing entities, each claiming to be the government of
Somalia. 173 One putative government sought to waive the defendant’s
170. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Wuerth, supra note 9.
171. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–89 (1983). For an
excellent short history, see Wuerth, supra note 9, at 924–29.
172. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 (relying upon statements of the State Department Legal
Adviser); accord Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285 (2010); Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004); see also Wuerth, supra note 9, at 927.
173. Statement of Interest, supra note 62, at Exhibit 1.
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immunity, while the other sought to invoke immunity. The United States
Under these circumstances, the
recognized neither government. 174
recommendation against official immunity is persuasive.
Given the lack of any legal principle to shape the granting of official
immunity, executive silence—like Sherlock Holmes’s dog in the night—
should speak volumes. The absence of an executive recommendation
usually should result in a judicial determination of no immunity. In this
regard, the executive frequently is dilatory in making recommendations.175
A court could reasonably conclude as a practical matter that if the executive
delays making a recommendation for a long time, the particular litigation
lacked significant foreign policy considerations or perhaps that very real,
but conflicting, considerations caused the delay. If the executive eventually
recommends immunity in the eleventh hour, the recommendation should be
given little weight unless reasons are presented for the inordinate delay.
3. Other Factors
Given the ad hoc nature of the process, other factors should be pertinent
in particular cases. The plaintiff’s citizenship may be important. Courts
may be more solicitous to the claim of a United States citizen who has been
tortured or enslaved in a foreign country. In addition, ATS litigation that
involves the judicial review of combat operations implicates another factor
that should be considered. In two cases, Israeli military officers have been
sued for the excessive use of force in military operations that caused the
deaths of innocent civilians. 176 The international law of war with respect to
targeting civilians is well established and universally accepted. It is a war
crime to launch an attack with knowledge that there will be an incidental
loss of civilian life if the civilian losses “would be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated.” 177
Many years ago, Justice Robert Jackson wrote:
It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist
that each specific military command in an area of probable operations will
conform to conventional tests of constitutionality. . . . The very essence

174. Id.
175. For example, in Samantar, the trial court initially stayed proceedings to allow the
State Department to have input. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283. After two years, the matter
was still under consideration by the State Department. Id.
176. In Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the Israeli army, as part of its
combat operations in Lebanon, shelled a United Nations compound and killed over a
hundred civilians. Id. at 1281–82. In Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009), the Israeli
army bombed an apartment complex in order to kill a Hamas leader. The bombing killed
fourteen people and injured others. Id. at 10–11.
177. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, § 2(b)(iv), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. For an excellent discussion, see Richard Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces
in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683
(2009).
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of the military job is to marshal physical force, to remove every obstacle
to its effectiveness, to give it every strategic advantage. 178

He continued: “In the very nature of things, military decisions are not
susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal.”179
Determining whether civilian casualties caused by a particular military
action are clearly excessive is an incredibly difficult and controversial
process. 180 Because the reality of combat operations is far removed from
the quiet of a judge’s chamber, courts should be reluctant to exercise
judicial review over combat decisions. Nevertheless, the undesirability of
second guessing combat decisions should be treated as only a significant
factor affecting official immunity. There may be cases in which the
underlying misconduct shocks the conscience or the executive branch
recommends against a grant of official immunity.
C. The Nature of an Official Immunity Dismissal
Official immunity in § 1983 is a defense on the merits, and a dismissal is
entitled to claim preclusion. But insofar as ATS litigation is concerned, the
considerations giving rise to official immunity are significantly different.
Section 1983 cases often arise from official conduct that was not clearly
unconstitutional, and officials are protected under this circumstance of
ambiguity. In contrast, the problem of ambiguous rules of conduct is not
nearly so severe in ATS litigation. In Sosa, the Court held that the
international norm must be clearly established and defined. More
significantly, if in granting foreign official immunity, courts give significant
weight to the political judgment of either the executive branch or of a
foreign government, foreign official immunity is radically different from
§ 1983 official immunity.
The direct influence of an extralegal political agenda has significant
consequences for classifying foreign official immunity as more similar to a
jurisdictional rule than a defense on the merits. The simple fact is that
politics change. A torturer or slaver who used to be in the in crowd may
wind up on the outs. There may be a change of government in the United
States or in the foreign country that changes the pertinent extralegal
political calculus. The practical possibility of the political winds blowing in
a different direction is enhanced by the long, ten-year statute of limitations
applicable to ATS litigation. 181 If the original reason for a sui generis grant
of foreign official immunity disappears, the need for a continuing grant to
that official disappears.
178. Koramatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 245. Jackson advanced this point as a consideration rather than a flat rule. In
Koramatsu, Jackson believed that this consideration was overridden when the executive
branch affirmatively sought judicial approval in a criminal prosecution of an unconstitutional
military decision. See id. at 245–46.
180. See Rosen, supra note 177, at 744–48.
181. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
Moreover, given the extralegal political nature of foreign official immunity, an official
immunity dismissal should continue the tolling of the statute of limitations.
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CONCLUSION
As these notes have suggested, the judicial task of legislating a doctrine
of foreign official immunity is fraught with linguistic difficulties. The
concepts of sovereign immunity and official immunity address entirely
different problems. Likewise, the defense of official immunity developed
for constitutional tort litigation stems from concerns that have little or no
relevance to ATS litigation. Courts should be particularly leery of invoking
the deceptively simple phrase “official capacity.” The task of legislating a
doctrine of foreign official immunity cries out for a functional approach that
eschews labels like sovereign immunity and official capacity.
Determinations should be ad hoc and not based upon general legal
principles. The scope of a foreign official’s immunity in a particular case
inevitably will turn on a judicial balancing of a number of considerations.

